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Conservatism, Democracy,
and Foreign Policy
Daniel J. Mahoney
In a penetrating essay dating from 1948,
the Hungarian political philosopher Aurel
Kolnai wrote that in our time, a balanced
defense of liberty should aim “to displace the
spiritual stress from the ‘common man’ as-
pect of Democracy to its aspect of constitu-
tionalism and of moral continuity with the
high tradition of Antiquity, Christendom,
and the half-surviving Liberal cultures of
yesterday.”1 Kolnai’s profoundly conser-
vative appreciation of the moral founda-
tions of democracy provides a principled
ground for resisting what Roger Scruton
has called “the culture of repudiation” and
for making one’s way in the culture wars.
Kolani’s thought can also provide inspira-
tion for a principled and prudent foreign
policy that does not confuse a robust de-
fense of liberty with doctrinaire support for
democracy abroad. An early critic of both
National Socialism and Soviet Commu-
nism, Kolnai knew that the Western world
has every reason to consider totalitarian-
ism the summum malum, the worst politi-
cal evil. But a variety of legitimate anti-
totalitarian political options exist even in a
“democratic” age. In foreign policy, the
intellectual alternatives are not exhausted
by cultural relativism, on the one hand,
and a democratic “progressivism” that over-
looks the fragility of political civilization,
on the other.
In my view, the West’s victory over Com-
munism is best understood not as a victory
for democracy per se—especially not for
democracy in its current, post-national and
post-religious manifestation—but rather,
as a defeat for the utopian illusion that
human beings could somehow live free and
dignified lives without property, religion,
nations, or politics. The collapse of Soviet
Communism was thus the definitive repu-
diation of what the Hegelio-Marxist phi-
losopher Alexandre Kojève called “the uni-
versal and homogenous state.” Kojève be-
lieved that by the mid-twentieth century
the avant-garde of humanity had put “an
end to history,” to all world-transforming
political or ideological contestation.
Henceforth, there would be no politics,
only the administration of things, whether
by Communist commissars or E.U. bu-
reaucrats. This was history’s inevitable de-
nouement. These fantasies ought to have
been revealed for what they were by the
annus mirabilis 1989.
Yet such is the hold of historicism on us
that politicians and theorists across the
ideological spectrum succumbed to the
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temptation to give a “progressivist” inter-
pretation of the end of the Cold War itself.
Marvelously mirroring Marxist arguments,
lifelong anti-Communists now claimed that
it was the West’s victory in the Cold War
that had been inevitable, that Communism
was destined to collapse because it had been
“on the wrong side of History.” In his ad-
dress to the British parliament in 1982,
Ronald Reagan had stated that “the Soviet
Union...runs against the tide of history by
denying freedom and human dignity to its
citizens.” Surely this noble statesman was
correct that Communism entailed nothing
less than a fundamental assault on “the
natural order of things.” But it was another
matter to turn the tables on the Marxists by
claiming that “History” favored the uni-
versal triumph of the democratic ideal.
With the systematic breakdown of classical
and Christian education in the Western
world, few were still capable of articulating
an older wisdom that refused to identify the
Good with the alleged movement of His-
tory.
With the publication of Francis
Fukuyama’s article “The End of History?”
in The National Interest in 1989 (and the
book which quickly followed on its heels),
the world was treated to a sophisticated
neo-“Marxist” interpretation of the fall of
Communism, this time at the service of a
broadly conservative politics. According
to Fukuyama, the end of the Cold War had
indeed culminated in something like the
“universal and homogenous state.” But in
one of those displays of dialectical clever-
ness beloved by social theorists, democratic
capitalism was now said to alone embody
the authentic “recognition of man by man.”
In a “Ruse of Reason” worthy of Hegel
himself, History had vindicated the bour-
geois order whose doom had been proph-
esied by a century and a half of “progres-
sive” thought.
Fukuyama’s thesis gave powerful impe-
tus to what can be called the “second
neoconservatism,” an intellectual current
that wished to follow up the defeat of Com-
munism with vigorous support for a “glo-
bal democratic revolution” aided and sus-
tained by the military and political power
of the United States. The first neocon-
servatism, in contrast to the second, had
been more anti-totalitarian than “demo-
cratic” in orientation, and was perfectly
willing to acknowledge the sheer intracta-
bility of cultures and civilizations. What-
ever the intellectual pedigree of some of its
adherents, the new neoconservatism owed
more to Alexandre Kojève than to Leo
Strauss, who had been an unremitting critic
of the “universal and homogenous state” in
all its forms. The new neoconservatism
shared few of the older neoconservatism’s
concerns about the pernicious spiritual and
cultural effects of a fully “democratized”
polity and culture (see almost any essay by
Irving Kristol from the 1970s) or its hesita-
tions about dogmatic support for human
rights in foreign policy (the locus classicus of
this position is Jeane J. Kirkpatrick’s im-
portant 1979 Commentary essay, “Dicta-
torships and Double Standards”).
Fukuyama’s Indictment
In his latest book, America at the Crossroads:
Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative
Legacy (Yale, 2006), Fukuyama ignores his
own role in the genesis of the “second
neoconservatism.” In important respects,
the present-day partisans of “muscular
Wilsonianism” have built upon Fukuyaman
premises about “the end of history” and the
unchallenged ideological ascendancy of lib-
eral democracy, even if they have empha-
sized the efficacy of military power more
than Fukuyama now thinks prudent. In his
current self-presentation, Fukuyama plays
Marx to William Kristol’s Lenin. He de-
fends the desirability and ultimate inevita-
bility of global democratization while criti-
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cizing ill-advised efforts to push the process
along. He sees himself as the true
neoconservative, one who has remained
faithful to neoconservatism’s original cri-
tique of large-scale social engineering and
its salutary concern about the unintended
consequences of social action. In his new
book and in the Postscript to the 2006 edi-
tion of The End of History and the Last Man,
Fukuyama defends a relatively uncon-
troversial version of modernization theory
that owes more to Tocqueville and Weber
than to Kojève. He claims that he “never
posited a strong version of modernization
theory, with rigid stages of development or
economically determined outcomes. Con-
tingency, leadership, and ideas always play
a complicating role, which made major
setbacks possible if not likely.”
There is an element of truth, as well as
much bad faith, in these formulations. The
second neoconservatism is, to be sure, more
activist than anything suggested in
Fukuyama’s original speculations about
the nature of the post-Cold War world. But
just as Leninist voluntarism—the revolu-
tionary effort to give History a shove to-
ward its ultimate destination—was a natu-
ral consequence of Marx’s own philosophy
of history, so Fukuyama’s announcement
of the ideological triumph of liberal de-
mocracy was bound to provide inspiration
for what was to become the second
neoconservatism. Fukuyama cannot evade
responsibility for his decisive role in inter-
preting the collapse of Communism in an
essentially progressivist or historicist light.
It is also difficult to understand why
Fukuyama needed to resort to an obscure
mélange of Hegel and Kojève, or to rhetoric
about the “end of history,” if all he had in
mind from the beginning was a relatively
innocuous version of modernization
theory. This born-again Tocquevillian now
more carefully distinguishes between eco-
nomic and social modernization (which
indeed has something “irresistible” about
it) and political liberty, which can never
simply be guaranteed by unfolding histori-
cal or social processes. To make that dis-
tinction, however, is to deny any essential
identification of modernization with “the
end of history.” It is to affirm with
Tocqueville and the classics that the politi-
cal problem is in principle unsolvable, that
History can never substitute for the im-
perative for human beings “to put reasons
and actions in common,” as Aristotle put it.
In addition to his failure to appreciate
the tendentious logic of his own position,
Fukuyama’s attribution of real or even
metaphorical Leninism both to the Bush
administration and to contemporary
neoconservatives is unjust and irrespon-
sible. It muddies the theoretical waters while
adding nothing to our understanding of
the real alternatives facing citizens and
statesmen today. Leninism entailed a self-
conscious abrogation of the moral law in
the name of a revolutionary project to cre-
ate a New Man and a New Society. It was a
manifestation of an inhuman ideological
impulse that Edmund Burke did not hesi-
tate to call (in different historical circum-
stances) “metaphysical madness.” Leninism
inevitably gave rise to totalitarianism be-
cause its ends were contra naturum and
because it provided ideological justifica-
tion for tyranny and terror on a truly un-
precedented scale. Neoconservatives such
as William Kristol may overstate the uni-
versal appeal of “democracy” and the role
that American power can play in promot-
ing it around the world. That is surely a
question for debate and discussion. But
they are decent men who have never claimed
that moral considerations can be suspended
in pursuit of utopian ends.
Moreover, the neoconservatives are
wrestling with a real problem made more
pressing by the terrorist attacks of Septem-
ber 11, 2001—namely, the multiple ways in
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which social stagnation and political
authoritarianism conspire to reinforce fa-
naticism throughout the Arab Islamic
world. And however “muscular” their ap-
proach to foreign policy, they have not
advocated the indiscriminate use of mili-
tary power or succumbed to the illusion
that democracy can simply be imposed from
“the barrel of a gun.” To suggest otherwise
is to engage in wild caricatures of a serious,
if flawed, approach to the conduct of Ameri-
can foreign policy.
There is thus something unhinged about
John Gray’s recent suggestion in the pages
of The American Interest (Summer 2006)
that “neoconservatism” represents the con-
tinuation of the Marxist-Leninist project
and that it will inevitably lead to the same
tragic consequences. These extreme formu-
lations—worthy of an ideologue and not a
political philosopher—would be easy to
dismiss if they did not also recur with alarm-
ing regularity in “realist” and “paleocon-
servative” criticisms of neoconservatism in
general, and the Bush foreign policy in
particular. President Bush is the first con-
servative president to be regularly casti-
gated as a “Jacobin” and “Leninist” by a
significant number of critics within the con-
servative intellectual community. Such
criticisms paradoxically obscure the genu-
ine weaknesses of the Bush Doctrine by
attributing mere fanaticism to a foreign
policy that in truth has equal measures of
strength and weakness.
A Neoconservative Foreign Policy?
The critics of current American foreign
policy tend to presuppose that the Bush
administration is carrying out a plan of
action that was designed in advance by
neoconservative intellectuals. In this view,
President Bush is somehow a captive of a
cabal of ex-Leftist Jewish intellectuals, stu-
dents of Leo Strauss, and a group of writers
and thinkers around William Kristol’s
Weekly Standard. It is conveniently forgot-
ten or ignored that none of the principals in
the administration is a neoconservative—
with the arguable exception of Vice Presi-
dent Cheney, who indeed moved closer to
neoconservative positions during his ten-
ure at the American Enterprise Institute in
the 1990s. It must be remembered that
neoconservative advocates of a militarily
assertive neo-Wilsonian foreign policy were
initially wary of George W. Bush and tended
to support the internationalist John
McCain in the 2000 Republican primaries.
As a candidate, Bush repeatedly expressed
his suspicion of humanitarian interven-
tions abroad and called for greater “humil-
ity” in the conduct of American foreign
policy. The first eight months of the Bush
Presidency were dedicated to a domestic
agenda of “compassionate conservatism”
centered around education reform and
“faith-based initiatives.” Bush’s initial in-
stincts about foreign policy—he did not
articulate anything as systematic as a doc-
trine or a grand strategy—were undoubt-
edly unilateralist, but they were by no means
unduly interventionist. In this regard at
least, 9/11 did indeed “change everything.”
Bush never became a neoconservative—
he operates too much on an instinctual
plane to join an intellectual party of any
sort—but he formed a tactical alliance with
those who provided a theoretical rationale
for a more assertive foreign policy. The so-
called Bush Doctrine “called for offensive
operations, including preemptive war,
against terrorists and their abetters, more
specifically, against the regimes that had
sponsored, encouraged, or merely toler-
ated, any ‘terrorist group of global reach.’”2
If preemptive action (not necessarily of a
military sort) against terror-supporting
“rogue states” was the weapon of choice of
the new strategic doctrine, the promotion
of democratic “regime change” provided
the moral compass for a foreign policy that
Conservatism, Democracy, and Foreign Policy by Daniel J. Mahoney
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aimed to take the fight to an unscrupulous
and nihilistic enemy. Its proponents vigor-
ously defended support for democratic
transformation in the Middle East as a new
kind of realism rather than an ideological
crusade motivated by abstract or utopian
considerations.
It is hard to deny that this overall project
is informed by a strong dose of realism and
contains no small element of daring and
moral nobility. For too long
the United States coddled cor-
rupt, autocratic regimes in the
Middle East as long as they kept
the oil flowing or served our
strategic interests. The new ap-
proach provided a comprehen-
sive framework for navigating
the post-9/11 world and a sense
of mission to an America that
had been awakened from her somnolence
by the surprise assault on our national soil.
President Bush was no doubt inspired by
the idea of striking at the very sources of
tyranny and terror in the Arab Islamic
world. But his decency and respect for com-
mon humanity, undeniable virtues in a
democratic statesman, led him to exagger-
ate the prospects for self-government in a
region where secular and religious
authoritarianism too often compete to
shape the destiny of peoples. In addition,
President Bush is a moralist who clearly
relishes an unequivocal confrontation with
political evil. He is inclined to see any quali-
fication of doctrinaire universalism as a
choice for “relativism” rather than a salu-
tary recognition of the undeniable fact that
self-government has crucial historical,
moral, cultural, and spiritual prerequi-
sites.
Strengths & Limits of the New Approach
The Bush administration is not wrong, of
course, to recognize important parallels
between Jihadist radicalism and the politi-
cal religions of the twentieth century. What-
ever the differences between the “pious cru-
elty” of the Islamists and the atheistic tyran-
nies of the twentieth century, both ideo-
logical currents disdained bourgeois de-
mocracy and repudiated the moral law in
the name of ostensibly more sublime aspi-
rations and goals. In his latest book, how-
ever, Fukuyama rightfully questions
whether Islamism poses the same kind of
“existential threat” to Western
civilization that was posed by
Communism and Nazism.
With its open contempt for ra-
tionality, civil society, and or-
dinary morality, and its disdain
for less virulent currents of Is-
lam, Jihadist extremism mainly
appeals to the marginal and dis-
located, to those who have been
uprooted by the whirlwinds of globaliza-
tion. It will never attract the sympathy of
Western intellectuals as Communism did
during the long social crisis that dominated
the first half of the twentieth century. The
West must prepare itself for a protracted
struggle with a fanatical international
movement that aspires to force the whole of
humanity to live within “the house of Is-
lam.” With such a movement there can be
no compromise or negotiated settlement.
Still, it is difficult to argue that in this
struggle the West’s very existence—or the
moral legitimacy of liberal democracy—is
genuinely at stake.
To be sure, any adequate response to the
terrorist threat demands a mixture of civic
and martial fortitude and political dexter-
ity that goes far beyond the anemic police
measures favored by quasi-pacifistic Euro-
peans today. But inexact talk about an
open-ended “war on terror”—which in
truth implies war without end—does not
adequately convey the unsettling gray zone
between war and peace that will character-
ize the international situation for the fore-
U.S. Soldiers in Iraq
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seeable future. Nor is it self-evident that
democracy, especially electoral democracy,
can provide the antidote to the Islamist
virus.
After 9/11 the Bush administration lost
an opportunity to articulate a textured
anti-totalitarianism on the model of the
old neoconservatism, one that combined
principled opposition to despotism with a
carefully calibrated politics of prudence.
Instead, President Bush increasingly de-
fined the global political alternatives in a
starkly Manichean way as a choice between
democracy and tyranny. His understand-
ing of the contemporary world rests on a
doctrinaire political science that in the end
recognizes one and only one path to human
freedom and flourishing. This is the down-
side of a positive feature. As we have seen
over the past five years, Bush’s clear-sighted
recognition of Good and Evil is the major
source of his principled tough-mindedness
as a statesman. He is to be applauded for his
ability to forthrightly name the enemy (and
to recognize that the West continues to
confront deadly enemies) in a democratic
world that is increasingly prone to take for
granted the spiritual unity of the human
race. But this admirable clarity about the
moral dimensions of the struggle also leads
the President to be too dismissive of the
gray middle ground that more often than
not defines the art of statecraft. Bush and
his neoconservative allies paradoxically
share no small measure of the humanitari-
anism that they rightly castigate when it
emanates from anti-political European and
American leftist intellectuals.
It should be acknowledged that the Bush
administration’s instincts and policies are
often significantly more prudent than its
official rhetoric and doctrine suggest. The
administration has no doubt been chas-
tened by the difficulty of pacifying Iraq and
of introducing lawful government in a coun-
try wracked by tribal passions and sectar-
ian divisions. Through bitter experience, it
has come to appreciate the profound diffi-
culties entailed in bringing self-government
to another people, especially one that has
been deeply scarred by despotism and is
bereft of a settled national consciousness.
The administration surely has arrived at a
more sober appreciation of the sheer in-
tractability of a part of the world deeply
rooted in spiritual sources that are alien to
the Western experience. Contrary to what
its more fevered critics suggest, it has no
stomach for organizing a global demo-
cratic imperium or embarking on new “wars
of choice.” While the administration con-
tinues to put too much emphasis on the
centrality of electoral democracy, it knows
how to work with “authoritarian” allies
who oppose Islamist fanaticism or who, in
its judgment, provide the best hope for
political stability and gradual liberaliza-
tion.
Conservatism and the
Rhetoric of Democracy
But the administration’s official rhetoric
continues to be marred by a tendency to
treat modern democracy as a self-evident
desideratum, even as the regime “accord-
ing to nature.” As friendly critics such as
Fareed Zakharia have pointed out, both
the administration and its neoconservative
allies woefully underestimate the despotic
propensities inherent in electoral democ-
racy, and this despite the rising electoral
fortunes of Islamist parties such as the Mus-
lim Brotherhood and Hamas in the Middle
East and of a Leftist authoritarian like Hugo
Chavez in Latin America. They continue to
speak ritualistically about “democracy”
when what they must really have in mind is
that complex synthesis of the rule of law,
constitutionalism, federalism, and repre-
sentative government that Zakharia calls
“constitutional liberalism.” Their “demo-
cratic” monomania marks a break with an
Conservatism, Democracy, and Foreign Policy by Daniel J. Mahoney
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older conservative tradition which always
insisted that Western liberty draws on in-
tellectual and spiritual resources broader
and deeper than that of modern democ-
racy. The idioms of constitutionalism and
representative government have little room
in a doctrine that places such inordinate
emphasis on the love of liberty in the hu-
man soul and its natural expression through
majority votes.
Critics who raise perfectly legitimate and
necessary questions about the cultural pre-
requisites of democratic self-government
are summarily dismissed by President Bush
or Prime Minister Blair as cultural relativ-
ists, or even as racists—as if “democracy”
arises automatically once impediments are
removed. As ominously, the partisans of
“global democracy” turn a blind eye to the
historical evidence that suggests it is not
from authoritarian regimes, but from weak
and fledgling “democracies,” that totali-
tarianism arises: consider Russia in 1917,
Italy in 1922, and Germany in 1933.3 The
best conservative thinkers of the last two
centuries have been wary of unalloyed de-
mocracy precisely because they cared deeply
about the preservation of human liberty
and recognized the powerful affinities be-
tween mass democracy and modern totali-
tarianism. There are totalitarian propensi-
ties inherent in what the French political
philosopher Bertrand de Jouvenel once
called “sovereignty in itself”: the illusion
that the “sovereign” human will is the ulti-
mate arbiter of the moral and political
world.
We are confronted, then, with a foreign
policy that in many respects operates within
sober parameters of principle and pru-
dence—but which is expressed in a self-
defeating rhetoric that both encourages
overreach and leaves the administration
vulnerable to tendentious criticism. When
the administration works with moderate
pro-American autocrats such as General
Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan it is inevita-
bly accused of hypocrisy. Putting inordi-
nate stress on the necessity of building de-
mocracy in Iraq and Afghanistan—rather
than speaking more modestly about
strengthening lawful and representative
institutions in both countries—creates
unreasonable expectations that are bound
to be disappointed. Such “democracy”
rhetoric also disarms the United States’
legitimate concerns about religious extrem-
ism (e.g. the imposition of Sharia) when it
is legitimized through the electoral pro-
cess. Who are we to challenge the sover-
eignty of a democratic people? A more cali-
brated rhetoric, one that emphasizes the
need to gradually introduce lawful and
non-despotic political orders in countries
ravaged by despotism or beset by corrup-
tion and authoritarianism would be less
dramatic and perhaps less inspiring. But it
would better describe the more modest and
often quite realistic hopes that drive actual
American policy in countries such as Iraq
and Afghanistan.
Excessively doctrinaire rhetoric about
democracy also creates misplaced pressures
to confront non-totalitarian regimes, such
as Vladimir Putin’s Russia, with demands
for “liberalization” that have nothing to do
with America’s legitimate national inter-
ests and everything to do with the view that
Western-style liberal democracy provides
the only legitimate model for political de-
velopment in our time. This necessarily
puts the administration in binds. The Vice-
President of the United States followed up
a May 4, 2006, speech in Vilnius, Lithuania—
one which implicitly threatened Russia with
a “color revolution” of its own if it did not
move in a more “democratic” direction—
with trips to Kazakhstan and Khirgistan to
do business with the local tyrants. Such a
brazen act of double-dealing confirms the
suspicions of skeptics who are already con-
vinced that American “universalism” is little
Conservatism, Democracy, and Foreign Policy by Daniel J. Mahoney
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more than a cover for national egoism and
will-to-power. The spirited resistance to
tyranny that has been the hallmark of ad-
ministration rhetoric since 9/11 needs to be
moderated and complemented by a greater
awareness of local conditions and a greater
modesty about America’s capacity to
judge—and dictate—the appropriate con-
ditions for self-government abroad. In
Russia, “National Bolsheviks” of the most
unsavory sort, not Western-style liberals,
are the real alternative to Putin’s compara-
tively liberal regime.
And in truth, the vituperative exchanges
between neoconservatives and paleocon-
servatives, and between foreign policy “re-
alists” and “idealists,” do little to contrib-
ute to the articulation of a politics of pru-
dence worthy of the name. Both the admin-
istration and the full array of American
conservative intellectuals need to learn how
to judiciously combine spiritedness and
moderation, Churchillian fortitude and
prudent self-restraint, in a way that does
justice to the perils that stem from both too
much and too little national self-assertion.
The Second Inaugural:
Nature, History, and the Human Soul
The democratic universalism of the Bush
Doctrine is expressed with particular lucid-
ity in the Second Inaugural Address deliv-
ered by the President on January 21, 2005.
That speech is the best single articulation of
the moral and philosophical premises un-
derlying contemporary American foreign
policy—or at least of the official doctrine
that animates it. But it also reveals some of
the deeply problematic assumptions in-
forming the administration’s policy “to
seek and support the growth of democratic
movements and institutions in every na-
tion and culture, with the ultimate goal of
ending tyranny in our world.” That heady
goal is presented as a fully practical ideal
even if Bush conceded on that occasion that
it is likely to be the “concentrated work of
generations.” That perfunctory concession
to gradualism in no way qualifies the
President’s “complete confidence in the
eventual triumph of freedom” or his belief
that democracy, and democracy alone, is
the regime that most fully coheres with the
nature and needs of human beings. For
President Bush, democracy has the support
of the deepest longings of the human soul
and of a Providential God who is also the
“Author of Liberty.”
To be sure, President Bush acknowledges
that democracy can take a variety of local
or cultural expressions. He denies that the
United States has any interest in “impos(ing)
our own style of government on the unwill-
ing.” Still, he fully identifies democracy as a
political form with the imperative of self-
government. Whatever latitude is left to
citizens and statesmen has to do with the
kind of democracy that will protect human
rights and human dignity within particu-
lar historical or cultural settings. President
Bush implicitly affirms that the whole of
humanity should and will eventually live
under the liberal democratic dispensation.
To that extent at least, he shares the
Kojèvean-Fukuyaman premise that the
“mutual recognition” of man by man will
inevitably culminate in a “universal and
homogenous state.”
In the Second Inaugural, Bush speaks
grandiloquently about “the global appeal
of liberty” and makes no distinction be-
tween support for liberty and the promo-
tion of a rather ill-defined “democracy.”
The President simply ignores or disregards
everything in modern historical experience
that suggests that modernization is com-
patible with various forms of “democratic
despotism.” The defeat of Communism is
interpreted as definitive proof that “the
world is moving toward liberty,” since “the
call of freedom comes to every mind and
every soul.”
Conservatism, Democracy, and Foreign Policy by Daniel J. Mahoney
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In his quite complimentary remarks to
the people of Hungary delivered on June
22, 2006, to commemorate the fiftieth anni-
versary of the Hungarian Revolution, Presi-
dent Bush makes a similar claim that, “the
desire for liberty is universal, because it is
written by our Creator into the hearts of
every man, woman, and child on the Earth.”
In this speech, Bush pays eloquent tribute
to the noble struggle of Hungarians in 1956,
all the while treating that “anti-totalitar-
ian revolution” (as Raymond Aron called it
at the time), that collective revolt against
the ideological “lie,” as evidence of the in-
evitable triumph of democracy over “dic-
tatorship.” In doing so, however, he risks
rendering that great event banal by turning
it into one more illustration of the “Whig”
version of history. The specificity of Com-
munist totalitarianism, the Christian and
European character of the Hungarian
people, and the fact that Hungarians them-
selves took the initiative to restore their
national independence and the authentic
meaning of words are all overlooked in this
rendering of events. The Hungarian Revo-
lution instead becomes raw material for the
inevitable victory of democracy in every
time and place.
As hortatory rhetoric, the President’s
words are undoubtedly stirring and even
ennobling. As political reflection, they re-
veal a shallow understanding of the com-
plex passions, interests, and motives that
move human beings. President Bush dog-
matically presupposes that love of liberty is
the predominant, even the overarching
motive of the human soul. He not only
downplays the cultural prerequisites of
ordered liberty or democratic self-govern-
ment but abstracts from the sempiternal
drama of good and evil in each and every
human soul. The President’s unqualified
universalism abstracts from the fact that
hatred of despotism by no means auto-
matically translates into love of liberty or a
settled and disciplined capacity for self-
government. It ignores Tocqueville’s pro-
found insight that the pure love of liberty—
the passion for political freedom and of
“government of God and the laws alone”—
is a “sublime taste” reserved for a few souls
and incomprehensible to “mediocre” ones.4
To be sure, Bush sometimes recurs to the
best conservative wisdom and acknowl-
edges that self-government necessarily en-
tails “the governing of the self.” He rightly
asserts that human rights are “ennobled by
service, and mercy.” But he more charac-
teristically makes extravagant claims about
love of liberty being the incontestable mo-
tive of thinking and acting man. As Charles
Kesler has observed, Bush ignores the pal-
pable fact that while “‘people everywhere
prefer freedom to slavery’...many people
everywhere and at all times have been quite
happy to enjoy their freedom and all the
benefits of someone else’s slavery.”5 Self-
government is a disposition of the soul that
finds powerful support in the soul’s refusal
to be tyrannized by others. But the two are
not equivalent. President Bush is not wrong
when he argues that despotism violates the
moral law and mutilates the wellsprings of
the human spirit. But he is too quick to
identify human nature with a single
overarching impulse or desire, and he goes
too far in conflating the ways of Providence
with the empire of human liberty.
Near the end of the Second Inaugural,
Bush anticipates some of these criticisms.
While continuing to express “complete con-
fidence in the eventual triumph of free-
dom” he attempts to distance himself from
arguments about historical inevitability.
“History” by itself determines nothing. In-
stead, our confidence in the universal tri-
umph of liberty must be rooted in the fact
that freedom is the “permanent hope of
mankind” and the most powerful “longing
of the soul.” These poetic invocations do
not adequately take into account the decid-
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edly “mixed” character of human nature.
The President should not be expected, of
course, to speak with the precision of a
political philosopher. Still, this President
of deep Christian conviction paradoxically
shows little appreciation for the tragic di-
mensions of history and the pernicious and
permanent effects of original sin on indi-
vidual and collective life.
Humanitarian Democracy
versus the United States
Moreover, the reduction of the political
problem to the categorical imperative of
promoting democracy abroad leaves the
administration and the country vulner-
able to those on the Left who identify de-
mocracy with a project to emancipate hu-
man beings from traditional cultural,
moral, and even political restraints. For
the partisans of “postmodern” or “humani-
tarian” democracy, the United States falls
far short of the “democratic ideal.” As the
French political philosopher Pierre Manent
has recently written, European elites “are
trying to separate their democratic virtue
from all their other characteristics,” such as
tradition, religion, and especially from the
political framework of the nation-state.
They have succumbed to what might be
called the “postpolitical temptation.” At
the same time, “Americans seem more than
ever willing—and this disposition extends
well beyond the partisans of the current
administration—to identify everything they
do and everything they are with democ-
racy, as such.”6 But what is to prevent the
partisans of humanitarian democracy from
denying the democratic bona fides of a self-
governing people that remains attached to
national sovereignty and still acknowledges
the importance of traditional arrangements
to a regime of self-government? By validat-
ing democracy as the alpha and omega of
politics in our time, the Bush Doctrine
leaves America vulnerable to delegit-
imization at the hands of more radical and
“consistent” forms of democratic affirma-
tion. In any case, deference to humanizing
universal moral and political truths in no
way means that any particular country
gives humanity unmediated access to the
universal. Abraham Lincoln, the noble
poet-statesman of the American experi-
ment, beautifully captured this tension
when he spoke of Americans as an “almost-
chosen people.” The United States (and the
Western world in general) would cease to
be true to itself if it repudiated the univer-
sality of its principles. But America surely
also owes much of its greatness to particu-
lar national characteristics, to what Orestes
Brownson has suggestively called our
“providential constitution.” Otherwise
America is in principle “the world,” the
prototype of a unified humanity, and is
destined to be swallowed up by a global
imperium that more fully embodies the
“democratic” aspirations of the whole of
mankind.
President Bush may not be a neocon-
servative in any narrow political or even
ideological sense. But his Second Inaugural
Address perfectly mirrors the contradic-
tions at the heart of the second neocon-
servatism. Like President Bush, neocon-
servatives are proud defenders of the pre-
rogatives of the United States as a free,
independent, and self-governing national
community. At the same time, they are
deeply suspicious of any other national self-
assertion, however moderate or humane,
that declines to “identify American democ-
racy with the universal as such.”7 At the
rhetorical level at least, the second
neoconservatism and the partisans of Eu-
ropean humanitarian democracy ulti-
mately differ more about means than ends.
They are “frères-ennemis” who promote
two distinct paths to the same destination,
the “universal and homogenous state.”
As I have tried to suggest, neocon-
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servatism’s misplaced one-sided emphasis
on democracy may be more the rhetorical
scaffolding than the heart and soul of
neoconservative wisdom. But this demo-
cratic monomania acts as an acid, eating
away at the coherence of a current of thought
whose patriotism, good will, and commit-
ment to the cause of liberty should in no
way be doubted. Alas, it cannot provide the
basis for a politics of prudence in our time.
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